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I. INTRODUCTION

When blockchain technology was first introduced via the now-infamous
Bitcoin in 2008, it was almost immediately recognized by the tech industry as
being even more valuable (and certainly less volatile) than the cryptocurrency it
embodied. The publicly distributed ledger known as the blockchain has created
a frenzy that is continuing to grow as industries explore future adaptations of the
technology. Following this explosion of cross-industry innovation, intellectual
property issues naturally follow as early adaptors seek to capture the value of
pioneering new blockchain technology. The rising popularity of the blockchain
has created an intellectual property gold-rush as firms hoping to capitalize on
new adaptations race to the patent office to have their "substantial
improvements" recorded. This note provides necessary background material
regarding intellectual property, particularly patent and copyright law, its
underlying policy and implementations, and application to the blockchain. It also
seeks to provide a solution to the problem of patent trolling and general
uncertainty regarding ownership of the newly minted blockchain technology.
Part II provides a comparison of patent and copyright law and examines
possible market effects. Part II also discusses patent policy and the underlying
economic incentive theory which prompted the Framers of the U.S. Constitution
to provide the basis for ownership in intellectual property. Finally, Part II
introduces the controversial problem of "patent trolling," wherein the trolling
company purchases patents for the sole purpose of exacting licensing fees or
enforcement damages from other entities. Part III begins with an analysis of the
current state of the blockchain patent landscape. Part III then considers three
potential sources for a solution to blockchain's current "patent problem": an
industry-led defensive alliance; potential legislative fixes; and ultimately, the
inevitable weigh-in by the courts, along with Alice implications on currently
existing patents, none of which have spawned substantive enforcement or
patent-challenge litigation (yet).
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

1. Patent and Copyright. Intellectual property refers to the ownership of a
"product of human intellect or property that derives from work of the mind."1
Because intellectual property is intangible, individual ownership of an idea, once
uttered, cannot be physically guarded. Thus, a "right" to a particular idea must

1 Eric Waltmire, Intelectual Property: Products of Human Creativity, 21 DCBA Brief 8
(2008).
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be enforced by some greater authority in order to be viable. 2 The U.S.
Constitution, in order "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"
gave Congress the power to bestow upon "[a]uthors and [ijnventors" a
' '3
temporary property right in their "respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.
Congress later bifurcated the clause, creating two major categories of intellectual
property-one for authors, the other for inventors-by passing separate patent4
and copyright5 acts during its first term in 1790.6 Although the two categories
have evolved over time, they remain distinct both conceptually and in the
breadth, duration, and vesting of their respective rights.7 Current copyright law
protects "original works ...in any tangible medium of expression," including
books, music, plays, and motion pictures.8 Patent law, on the other hand,
protects "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 9 Copyright "rights" vest
immediately upon the creation of copyrightable material in any tangible medium
of expression (although formal registration may be required later for
enforcement). 10 Copyright protects against reproduction, distribution, and
display of the copyrighted work" but does not protect against independent
creation of identical or substantially similar work by someone else. 12 In general,
the length of a copyright extends through the life of the creator plus an additional
13
70 years.
Unlike the automatic privileges of copyright, an inventor seeking patent
protection must first file an application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), and patent rights vest only upon government approval. "In
order to secure a patent, an applicant must demonstrate, among other things,
that the invention is new, useful, and nonobvious ....,,14In return for
completing the application process, a successful patent applicant is then awarded
2 Daniel Austin Green, Indigenous Intellect: Problems of Calng Knowledge Properly and Assigning
It Rights, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. Rfv v. 335 (2009).
3 U.S. CONST. an. I, § 8, cl.8.
4 An Act to promote the progress of useful Arts, ch. 7, § 1, 1, Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed
1793).
5 An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, ch.
15 § 1, 1, Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1802).
6 Gregory N. Mandel, The Pubc Perreption of Intellectual Propert, 66 FLA. L. REv. 261, 266
(2014).
7Id

8 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (Westaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
9 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
10 17 U.S.C.A. 55 102, 411(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
11 17 U.S.C.A. 5 106 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
12 Feist Publi'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
13 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
14 Mandel, supra note 6, at 266-67.
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with broad protection, prohibiting the making, using, selling, or importing of a
5
patented good-even by independent creation.' However, this breadth of
has a lifespan of a
protection lasts only a fraction of a copyright term: a patent
16
mere 20 years, beginning on the date of the application.
2. Economic Incentive. How exactly do patent and copyright law fulfill their
17
constitutional purpose to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"?
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare."'1 8 This utilitarian theory is predominant throughout
American IP law, 19 and is premised on the proposition that without economic
incentive, would-be authors and inventors within a free market will be less
inclined to expend their efforts and resources to create new artistic works or
inventions. 20 This economic incentive is not naturally present in the production
of intellectual property because of intellectual property's intangible nature: once
a new artistic work or invention is created and offered to the public for sale, the
21
underlying idea or knowledge is subject to copying by second adaptors. This
occurs because knowledge and information itself is by its nature a public good;
it is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable, meaning others can benefit from an
idea without any additional cost, and indeed, it is difficult if not impossible to
prevent others from benefiting without paying.22 This exploitation by third-party
second adaptors is particularly attractive because they bear none of the costs
involved in initial research or development of the idea, and can sell at a lower
price. 23 Thus, "an exclusive privilege is absolutely necessary" in order to
encourage desirable innovation because "[w]ithout the assistance of the laws, the
inventor would almost always be driven out of the market . ,"24 Given that the
constitutional fix to the free market's underproduction of intellectual property
15 35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
16

35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).

17 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).

19 Peter S. Mennell, 1600 IntellectualProper*.:GeneralTheories,in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 130, 131 (Boudewin Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geese ed. 1999) available at
http://www.dielevine.com/archive/ittheory.PDF ("The utilitarian framework has been
particularly central to the development of copyright law in the United States"); Dan L. Burk
& Mark A. Lemley, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575 at 1578 (2003) ("...most theorists agree on the general
utilitarian framework of patent law...").
20 Mandel, supra note 6, at 269-70.
21 Id
22 David W. Barnes, Congestible IntellectualPropery and Impure Pub&c Goods, 9 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 533, 534 (2011).
23 Jeremy Bentham, A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 71 (G.P. Putnam 1839).
24 Id.
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"goods" is to grant a mini-monopoly to the creator, it follows that the public will
suffer the negative consequences naturally arising from monopoly. After all, the
public would benefit in the absence of patent and copyright from the second
adaptor's cheaper product-assuming the product was created to begin with,
absent intellectual property's monopolistic incentive. Thus, the granting of
intellectual property rights does constitute a trade-off among the public: more
and better goods in exchange for higher-than-competitive prices (at least during
the duration of the copyright or patent). This makes sense policy-wise, until the
public costs of granting these mini-monopoly rights outweigh the benefits of
more and better goods. Because a competitive free market will naturally underproduce public goods such as intellectual property, intellectual property law
should be viewed as a solution to a free market failure. 25 However, it is critical to
remember that creating and awarding temporary property rights is not the
ultimate end-goal intimated by the Constitution and to be watchful for instances
in which intellectual property law itself may impede the promotion of science
26
and the arts.
3. The Patent Trolling Problem. Accepting that patents are intended to generate
increased innovation by incentivizing developers with lucrative minimonopolies, patent trolling presents a circumstance in which the person (or more
likely, legal entity) holding a patent is neither the inventor nor producer of the
patented good.27 Instead, these "non-practicing entities" (NPEs) purchase
patents for the sole purpose of cashing in on their patent-blessed monopoly by
asserting patent-holder rights against other companies, either by suing (or
threatening to sue) for patent infringement or by selling them a licensing
agreement. 28 A patent troll exercises only the same basic rights given to every
patent-holder; but unlike those held by inventors and innovators, these rights
seem misplaced when wielded by profit-gorging companies who, from their very
nature as NPEs, contribute nothing to the goal of promoting innovation. "Like
the proverbial troll who waits under the bridge to collect a toll from unwary
passers-by, a 'patent troll'. . . exacts a toll, in the form of a license fee, from other
persons or entities the 'troll' believes infringes (or do infringe) the patent."'29
Patent trolls present an incentive problem: namely, the Constitutionally-granted
economic incentive to promote science and the arts is not actually incentivizing
any innovation in the hands of these non-practicing entities. However, even
Mandel, supra note 6, at 269.
See generaly John M. Golden, "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2111
(2007).
27 Todd Klein, Bay v.MercExchange and KSR Int'l Co. v.Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Wages
WarAgainst Patent Trolls, 112 PENN. ST.L. REv. 295, 295-96 (2007).
28 Id. at 296.
29 Wayne Winegarden, Who Are PatentTrolls and What Wi/H.R 9 Do About Them?, FORBES,
May 29, 2015, https://www.forbes.com/sites/econostats/2015/05/29/who-are-patenttrolls-and what-will-h-r-9-do-about-them/#11786d231582.
25
26
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entities deemed patent trolls presumably purchased their patent from an
innovator who received at least a nominal economic incentive for their work,
and there is healthy debate on whether or to what extent so-called trolls actually
harm the ultimate goal of innovation. 30 Accepting that the economic incentive
to create is at least somewhat misplaced among non-practicing entities, how
powerful (and harmful) is a patent wielded by a troll? To understand the breadth
of the problem, a look at the underlying patent system is helpful. The USPTO
31
receives over a half-million patent applications each year. The patent
32
examination process currently takes upwards of two years, and the application
33
success rate is around 55% for new (non-renewal) patents. Once granted, a
patent carries a presumption of validity-meaning a potential competitor seeking
to use the patented technology carries the burden of proving by "clear and
34
convincing evidence" that the patent was improperly granted. Despite the
seemingly lengthy two-year application process, critics of the current patent
system point to the Patent Office's limited fiscal and human resources, as well as
lack of third-party or adversarial process as evidence that the Office's 55%
acceptance rate does not warrant such great deference. 35 Their argument is
basically this: despite the Patent Office's general expertise in technology, the
scope of patent coverage is too broad for an examiner to have expertise in the
precise technology seeking a patent-which is presumably novel and cuttingedge itself.36 The Patent Office could remedy this by hiring more examiners with
greater expertise, but this increase in effectiveness would increase the cost of the
patenting process for inventors and be prohibitively expensive. 37 Lastly, given
the examiners' necessarily limited expertise in the new and novel patent-seeking
technology, they are forced to rely upon documentation provided by the
applicant. 38 This is, of course, unavoidable given the confidentiality necessary for
30 See generalyvJoe Nocera, THE PATENT TROLL SMOKESCREEN, N.Y. TIM-Es (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/opinion/the-patent-troll-smokescreen.html;
Jaconda Wagner, Patent Trolls and the High Cost of iftgation to Business and Start-ups - A Myth? 45
MD. BJ.12 (2012).

31 United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Patent Statistics Reports,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm.
32 Vic Lin, How long is the US patent applicationprocess (how much time does it take to get a utiky
patent)?, PATENT TRADEMARK BLOG, IP Q&A (Sept. 17, 2018),

http:// www.patenttrademarkblog.com/how-long-us-utility-patent-application-process/.
33 Michael Carley, Deepak Hegde & Alan Marco, What is the Probability ofReceivng a U.S.
Patent?,17 YALEJ.L. &TECH. 203 (2015).
34 Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Vak'o, 60
STAiN. L. REv. 45, 47 (2007).
35 Id. at 51-56.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38

Id.
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pre-patented technologies. 39 However, the absence of any adversarial
proceeding-deemed quintessential in other legal proceedings as the best
process for the revelation of full information-supports the conclusion that the
patenting process itself might often produce false positives in the form of
wrongfully-approved patents. 4° The negative market consequences following
this possibility of a false patent are compounded by the fact that a competitor
who seeks to begin using or continue to use potentially infringing technology
must face the burden of overcoming the patent's presumptive validity.41 Facing
the prospect of expensive and time-consuming litigation in which the allegedly
infringing company carries the burden of proof, companies may find it in their
best interest to yield to the demands of a patent troll rather than face uncertainty
42
in court.
In addition to misdirected incentives and the patent-process problem, a
strategic patent troll scheme has naturally emerged to take full advantage of the
current patent system. The strategy starts with a "trolling arsenal" equipped with
a portfolio of inexpensive, broad, and widely applicable patents. '43 In order to
be profit-maximizing for the troll, patents should be purchased as cheaply as
possible with the greatest utility possible-meaning patents that are broad
enough to be brandished against as many other organizations as possible, or that
cover a specific and essential component of a particularly deep-pocketed target
company's technology. 44 Bankruptcy proceedings provide a unique opportunity
for trolls to purchase patents at heavily discounted prices from failed technology
companies. 45 Once an effective arsenal is in place, a patent troll has three central
money-making strategies for wielding its weapons: obtaining licensing fees,
procuring settlements, and seeking court-ordered damages for infringement. 46
Patent trolls are a well-established part of American IP law and result in
predictable inefficiencies and social costs; blockchain is merely the newest
playground at which these IP bullies have shown up.
B. THE BLOCKCHAIN

1. The Blockchain's Orins in Bitcoin. Blockchain technology is perhaps best
explained using its original public debut: the Bitcoin. In 2008, a mysterious
cryptographer (or cryptographers) working under the pseudonym Satoshi

39 Id. at 46.
40 Id. at 54-55.
41 Id. at 51.
42 Anna Mayergoyz, Lessons FromEurope on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls 42 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 241, 248 (2009).
43 Id. at 245.

44 Id. at 246.
45 Id.

46 Id. at 247.
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Nakamoto published the Bitcoin Whitepaper, outlining a decentralized peer-topeer system for making payments online using a new form of electronic money:
the bitcoin. 47 Under the pre-bitcoin model, two parties seeking to exchange
money via the Intemet used a trusted third party-such as a bank-to facilitate
the transaction. 48 However, a bank cannot perfectly guarantee a transaction, and
the costs of mediating disputes are transferred to the parties via fees, minimun
transaction amounts, and reduced privacy in the form of additional customer
information requirements. 49 To solve these problems, Nakamoto proposed a
cryptocurrency exchange facilitated by a distributed ledger system known as the
blockchain.50 The bitcoin itself is composed of a chain of digital signatures, and
51
exchanging a bitcoin occurs by adding your "signature" to the end of the chain.
To avoid duplicate spending with the same coin, each transaction is timestamped
and publicly announced via a public ledger-the blockchain.5 2 The blockchain is
best understood as a public archive of all past transactions among collective
bitcoin users, from the very first transaction between Satoshi and fellow4
53
programmer Hal Finney, to the most recently verified group of transactions.5
Before being permanently added to the blockchain, transactions are grouped into
blocks and verified according to their timestamp by various independent
computers connected to the bitcoin network, called nodes. 55 Each node receives
a copy of the blockchain ledger and independently works to satisfy a complex
algorithm in order to verify the block. Any disagreement among nodes is
resolved using the "consensus mechanism. ''5 6 Thus, the integrity of the
blockchain depends upon an ever-present majority of honest nodes. However,
the ability of a group of rogue actors to successfully manipulate the blockchain
becomes exponentially less probable as the numbers of transaction blocks and
nodes increase.5 7 The process of adding a new block to the chain currently takes
47 Bitcoin White Paper:.Beginner's Guide, (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.bitcoin.com/guides/
(hsrviScp17,2918.
Peer-to-Peer Electronic
Bitcoin: A
Nakamoto,
48 Satoshi
https://www.bitcoin.com/bitcoin.pdf. (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).
49 Id.
50

Cash

System

1

Id.

51 Id.at 2.
52 Id.
53 Nathan Jessop, A BriefHistogy of Bitcoin - and Where it's Going Next, (Mar 29, 2015) THE
NEXT WEBB, https://thenextweb.com/insider/2015/03/29/a-brief-history-of-bitcoin-and-

where-its-going-next/#.tnw rqeRrL6r (last visited Sept. 28, 2017).
54 Investopedia.com, Blockchain, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp
(last visited Sep 28, 2017).
55 Id.
56 Nakamoto, supranote 48, at 8.
57

Id.
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about 10 minutes.5 8 However, the confirmation time for a particular transaction
can vary significantly (from a few seconds to 90 minutes) depending on the fee
the sender pays. 5 9 The fee attached to a transaction is completely discretionarya sender may choose not to pay any fee at all-but doing so removes the only
incentive for nodes to verify the transaction in a timely manner. 60 Six
confirmations is commonly considered to be the safety equivalent to six months
on a credit card transaction. 61 Sophisticated cryptography allows this distributed
ledger to be both widely public, yet concurrently private for individualized users.
2. The Future of Blockchain. Although the terms bitcoin and blockchain are
currently used almost synonymously, the blockchain technology underpinning
bitcoin has far greater technological implications. In his opening statement
addressing the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade,
Congressman Michael Burgess described blockchain technology as having "the
potential to disrupt a whole host of industries from financial services to
manufacturing, supply chain management, and to health care records, by infusing
transparency and trust in traditionally closed systems. ' 62 Rep. Burgess cited the
"billion dollars in capital investment [from] over 1,000 firms, most of which are
startup companies," as evidence that the blockchain was already beginning to
have considerable impact on the economy. 63 What kind of adaptations does a
billion-dollar investment across multiple industries produce? The most logical
next step for the blockchain is Big Finance-and somewhat ironically, the
industry that was supposed to be obliterated by the blockchain has been its most
aggressive adaptor. 64 Banks, of course, can use the blockchain in much the same
way that Bitcoin does-as a distributed ledger to record money transactions.
However, banks have focused on "permissioned blockchains," which can be
restricted to the banks' customers and authorized personnel. 6 The blockchain
has the capability of transforming the finance industry entirely-everything from
trading stock, wiring money, and even internal bank processes such as regulatory
compliance. Smart contracts, or self-executing transaction protocols, are also an
emerging and potentially industry-altering blockchain application. 66 Another
58 Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN PROJECT, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#whatis-bitcoin (last visited Oct. 4, 2017).
59Id
6 Id.
61

Id.

The DisrupterSeries: DigitalCurreng,and Blockchain Technology: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energ and Commerce, 114th Cong. 1 (2016)
(statement of Rep. Michael C. Burgess, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade).
62

Id.
Banking on the Blockchain, MORGAN STANLEY, https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/
big-banks-try-to-harness-blockchain (lastvisited Oct. 6, 2018).
63

64

65 Id.
66

Zibin Zheng, et al., Blockchain Challengesand Opportunities:A Survey, INT.J. WEB

AND GiD

SERVICES. 1, 19 (2011).
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more general application of the blockchain is individual digital security. In the
wake of massively expensive corporate security breaches (think Home Depot
and Target), the blockchain, through encrypted digital signatures, offers an
authorization process that is self-assured and efficient. 67 Blockchain could also
revolutionize the way healthcare industries keep and share patient records,
68
reduce fraud in online-shopping, and has the potential to revolutionize logistics
and supply-chain management through more efficient paperwork processing,
69
counterfeit identification, and origin and status tracking. The sheer diversity of
potential blockchain applications should have dollar signs popping into your
head-the next big question is how to successfully capture that value.
3. Who owns the blockchain? Although Satoshi Nakamoto is the attributed
creator7 ° of the blockchain, the technology's genesis is actually a bit more
complex: Bitcoin was developed using open-source software, and like many
open-source projects of its size, the blockchain software is the collaborative
7
work-effort of numerous programmers worldwide. ' Nakamoto himself cites
eight authorities in the Bitcoin Whitepaper, including Wei Dai, who first
suggested the idea of a decentralized cryptocurrency in 1998.72 The open-source
nature of the blockchain's underlying software has several implications for future
adaptors and consumers. 73 Perhaps of greatest relevance to the end-user is the
74
fact that open-source software is generally free to download and use. Unlike a
Microsoft Word subscription, you can install the latest version of open-source
blockchain software as many times, and on as many computers, as you would
like, and its actual use is likewise unrestricted by the typical mandatory useragreement.75 From a developer's perspective, open-source means the freedom to
modify the underlying source code and redistribute it.76 Open-source naturally

1(%9.44AM
67 Due.com 6 Blockchain Applications That Go Byond Bitcoin, NASDAQ, Pm 1,
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/6-blockchain-applications-that-go-beyond-bitcoincm716269
68 Id.
69 Niels Hacldus & Moritz Petersen, Blockchain in Logistics and Supply Chain: Trick or Treat?

2017 HAMBURG INT'L CONF. OF LoGisTics.
70 Id.

71 Who Developed Bitoin?, BITCOIN.COM, https://www.bitcoin.com/info/who-developedbitcoin (last visited Oct. 6, 2018).
72 Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOiN.ORG, http://bitcoin.org/en/faq#who-createdbitcoin (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).
73 Chris Hoffman, What is Open Source Software, and Wsy Does it Matter?, How TO GEEK (pt
26 2J16) https://www.howtogeek.com/129967/htg-explains-what-is-open-source-softwareand-why-you-should-care/.
74 Id

75 Id.
76 Id.
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facilitates collaboration amongst coders from all corners of the globe who would
likely never come in contact with each other otherwise.
Although open-source software seems to theoretically fall into the public
domain category, it is often actually protected by a copyright license--commonly
called a "copyleft" license, because it serves the reverse function of regular
copyright by allowing wide adoption among users. 77 Although there is a small
variety of available open-source licenses, the blockchain is specifically covered
under a MIT license-a half-page document which states the underlying
software is "AS-IS" and includes broad disclaimers of warranties and damages.7 8
Importantly for this discussion, the MIT license does not reference
patentability.7 9 Thus, although the blockchain code is protected against further
copyright, adaptations of the underlying blockchain code, if sufficiently new,
useful, and nonobvious, are eligible for patent protection.
11I.
ANALYSIS
A. CURRENT BLOCKCHAIN PATENT LANDSCAPE

Since the blockchain was first introduced in 2008, it is estimated that "over
2,500 patent applications have been filed" for inventions that have either
implemented blockchain technology or improved upon it. 80 Large financial
institutions have been some of the first applicants in the rush to the patent office;
Goldman Sachs, MasterCard, and Bank of America have each submitted
applications for their own proprietary blockchain inventions, 81 with MasterCard
and Bank of America filing over thirty blockchain-related patent applications
apiece. 82 Behind each patent filing is a host of lawyers-and of course, the
innovative team that came up with the idea to be patented. These first-adaptors
sink considerable financial resources into each new patent, despite general
market uncertainty and rumors of an impending "patent war" involving
blockchain technology. Ambiguity regarding the patentabilty of the blockchain
creates a considerable disincentive for first-adaptors to make this investment.
77 Paul Keller & Sue Ross, A Few Things to Consider Before PatentingBlockchain Tech, LAw360
Cep%27,2I6,127PM),https://www.law360.com/articles/843185/ print?section =banking.
78 Id.
79 Id.

8oKeith B. Letourneau & Stephen T.Whelan, Blockchain: Staying Ahead of Tomorrow, J.
EQUIPMENT

OF

LEASE FINANCING Spring 2017, at 3, https://www.store.leasefandation.org/

products/JELF2017SPRJFULL.pdf.
81See Olga Kharif, Big Banks are Stocking Up on Blockchain Patents, BLOOMBERG.ORG (Dec.
21, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-21/who-owns-blockchaingoldman-bofa-amass-patents- for-coming-wars.
82 Bruce Berman, Blockchainpatentpublicationspicked
up speed inAngust,IPCLosEUP.coM. (Au
29,2
17) https://ipcloseup.com/2017/08/29/blockchain-patent-publications-quickened-pacein-august/.
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There are three possible resolutions to this problem: (1) the market works itself
out, i.e., blockchain adaptors and patent trolls go to war, each side picks a
strategy, and individual winners and losers are announced in the courtroom; (2)
the legislature steps in; or (3) the court system adopts a uniform rule.
B. A MARKET RESOLUTION

First adapters of the blockchain have tried to curb future blockchain battles
by creating a barricade using their collective patents. A majority of the entities
filing applications with the patent office have already stated that they intend to
only use their prospective patent defensivel--meaning that, if granted a patent,
they will not attempt to prevent others from using similar or even the same
invention by suing to enforce their patent (i.e., using the patent offensive~y). "In its
most basic form, defensive patenting is the practice of seeking patents in order
to deter offensive lawsuits rather than to gain more traditional patent benefits
such as seeking licensing revenue, facilitating joint research and development, or
excluding competitors. '83 In theory, a patent used only defensively is like an
insurance policy: the company holding the patent uses it as a shield to prevent
being sued by other companies operating in the same industry or using similar
technology. 84 The defensive patent strategy is a market-developed response to
the substantial risk involved in implementing and relying upon intellectual
85
property for business operations.
There are a few shortcomings to this market solution. Perhaps most obvious
is the fact that although a patent-holder may state that its intent is to use a patent86
defensively, the patent office does not issue a specialized defensive-only patent.
This means that whatever the patent-holder's original intent, they do have some
discretion to change their mind later (although a patent-holder may be estopped
from enforcing a patent after knowingly allowing extended infringement). A
second shortcoming to this approach is that although a defensive patent provides
some protection to the patent-holder, this protection does not automatically
extend to the market as a whole. However, a competitor may be able to claim

83 Jason Schultz & Jennifer M. Urban, ProtectingOpen Innovation:The Defensive PatentLicense as
a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 1, 6, 68 (2012).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 See general# Inventor Resources, 1I'pes of Patent Applications and Proceedings, USPTO.GOV,
(updated Nov. 16, 2017, 11:54AM) https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patentbasics/types-patent-applicationsproceedings.
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reasonable reliance on a "patent pledge" or publicly announced defensive patent
87
strategy under basic contract law theory.
Another possible market solution is to create patent coalitions, where
companies with similar patents pool their intellectual property to create a much
larger combined defensive patent shield. "To engage in defensive patenting,
competitors within an industry each build significant patent portfolios and then
threaten to use those portfolios in response to offensive patent threats. The
greater the size and scope of a given firm's portfolio, the more dangerous and
costly it is to litigate against, thus serving as an ex ante deterrent. '88
Unfortunately, even pooled patent portfolios tend to be an ineffective shield
against patent trolls. Indeed, these portfolios present an exponentially greater risk
of exposure if the portfolio ends up in the hands of a patent troll, 89 because the
potential of provoking a retaliatory infringement suit from participants in the
patent pool does not faze the typical non-practicing entity. 90
C. A LEGISLATIVE FIX

Currently, the blockchain-patent war conversation is taking place
predominately in the private sector. State legislatures are just now adopting
legislation recognizing the technology, with some forward-thinking states
adopting their own task forces on the topic. 9 1 However, because patents are
granted by the federal government, there seems to be little that states can do to
influence patent-holders' property rights. 92 At the federal level, Congress has
been characteristically slow to act. Despite hearings dating back to 2013, and a
Texas Congressman's efforts to introduce a bill proposing a moratorium on all
regulation of cryptocurrencies, neither house appears to be in any hurry to act.93
Yet legislation (like patent trolls) often follows big money; as private
companies find their lucrative blockchain innovations are being threatened, they

87 See generaly James M. Rice, The Defensive PatentPlaybook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725,
748 (2015).
88 Schultz & Urban, supra note 83, at 6.
89 Id. at 17.
90 See generally id.
91 Luke Parker, US States Working on blockchain legislation in 2017, BRAVENEWCOIN.COM, (Apr.
2, 2017), https://bravenewcoin.com/news/us-states-working-on-blockchain-legislation-in2017/.
92 Some states have attempted to address the patent trolling problem by prohibiting
accusations of patent infringement made in bad faith. See 2016 Patent Troll Legislation,
NCSL.ORG, gJuly12,2D3)http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/201 6patent-troll-legislation.aspx
93 See generaly Jayanand Sagar, Witnesses at Senate Bitcoin Hearing Include FinCEN,
NEwsBTC.coM, (Nov. 14, 2013, 11:34 AM) https://www.newsbtc.com/2013/11/14/
witnesses-senate-bitcoin-hearing-include-fincen-secret-service/;
H.R. 5777, 113th Cong.
(2014).
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may find the services of lobbying firms an attractive investment. A very basic
legislative solution would be the creation of a federal open-source patent that
allows the original innovator to seek a patent that ensures the availability of the
technology to future adaptors and requires further innovations to remain opensource. As previously discussed, copyright law has been adapted for a similar
effect via open-source licenses. However, under current patent law, the doctrine
private parties from instituting a form of patent
of patent misuse prevents
"copyleft" via contract. 94 The doctrine of patent misuse prevents parties from
95
extending the power of the original patent -thus, a patent with a twenty-year
monopoly cannot regulate all future patents based on the original idea.
An alternate solution would be for Congress to create an official defensive
patent for adaptors seeking protection against patent trolls. As previously
discussed, these patents would not necessarily deter non-practicing entity trolls
from initiating law suits. On the other hand, an official "defensive patent" which
prohibits the holder from asserting claims against other users would at least
negate the problem of powerful patent portfolios falling into the hands of trolls
and provide assurance to the current blockchain-patent landscape.
Despite these possible legislative solutions to the impending blockchainpatent war, new legislation is perhaps the least probable fix to the patent
problem. The process of turning a bill into a law requires a certain amount of
political momentum; the possibility of success is dubious, particularly in today's
political climate. Additionally, the court system is perhaps better equipped to
address the problem without crafting dramatically new legislation.

D. A SUPREME COURT RULE EXTENDING ALICE TO THE BLOCKCHAIN

Due to ineffective defensive coalitions and the impracticalities of new
legislation, blockchain's patent problem will most likely be left up to the courts
to solve. Despite significant efforts and expense by U.S. companies seeking to
patent their substantial improvements on the blockchain and even their relative
success in receiving patents, it remains unclear how the courts will analyze this
new technology under current patent law. Although there has been significant
patent activity regarding blockchain applications to a wide variety of industries,
as of the writing of this note, none of these applications have resulted in appeals
within the patent office (which would then be appealable to the Federal Circuit).
Similarly, none of the granted patents have spawned litigation. However, as
industries figure out how to capitalize off of their blockchain inventions, the fight

94 Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is it PatentMisuse? 6 MINN. J.L. SCI.
&TECH. 117, 135, 126 (2004).
95 Id. at 136.
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for a twenty-year monopoly via patent is sure to follow. Current intellectual
property law provides some guidance, although exact application will remain
uncertain until properly litigated.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently clarified what constitutes patentable
subject-matter in the computer software case Alice Coip. Py v. CLS Bank Int'l.96
Alice involved a patented computer system designed to mitigate settlement risk
within financial transactions. 97 Settlement risk is the issue of trust underlying a
transaction-it is "the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial
exchange will satisfy its obligation" 98 (aptly, this is also one of the basic issues
blockchain purports to solve). In analyzing whether certain material is patentable,
the Court distinguished between "patents that claim the building blocks of
human ingenuity, which are ineligible for patent protection, from those that
integrate the building blocks into something more." 99 The Court referred back
to the two-step test announced in Mayo to determine what material rises to the
level of patentability: "[f]irst, we determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts," which includes "laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." 1° 0 The court analyzes the
patented invention both element-by-element and then as a whole to determine if
the nature of the invention falls within one of the patent-exempt categories. 101 If
the patented invention fails at step one, it may still be redeemed under Mayo step
two, where the court "examine[s] the elements of the claim to determine whether
it contains an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea
into a patent-eligible application. 10 2 In addition to finding that the claimed
methodology for mitigating settlement risk was unpatentable, the Court in Alice
reiterated the fact that merely computerizing an abstract idea, such as an
algorithm, is not a sufficiently new or useful application necessary in order to be
1 03
patent-eligible.
The precedent established in Alice, though not directly on-point for litigation
involving cryptocurrencies or the blockchain, provides a workable rule that the
Federal Circuit can apply to new applications of blockchain technology. The
broader the court's application of the Alice ruling to blockchain patents, the fewer
patents that will stand. This is perhaps the simplest solution to the blockchain
patent problem because it negates the patent and coveted monopoly implications
96

134 S.Ct. 2347, 2351 (2014).

97Id.at 2349.
98 Id.at 2349.
99Id.at 2350 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 88
(2012)(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
100Id.at 2355 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 88
(2012)).
101 Id.
102Id.at 2357.
103 Id.
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altogether; a blockchain application that is unpatentable is left to the public
domain, which allows future innovators to use the idea freely and without
recourse from would-be trolls. Right now, this decision-whether a blockchain
application is patentable or not-is being made within the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office. Given the sheer number of blockchain related patents that
have been issued, it appears the rule announced via Alice has not been applied in
a sweeping fashion.
TV. CONCLUSION

Despite its mysterious origins, blockchain technology has the ability to
dramatically transform multiple industries, from finance to healthcare to
government voting and beyond-yet questions of ownership threaten to stall
and even suppress future innovation and adaptation. The beginnings of a new
technology wave and the uncertainty surrounding its associated intellectual
property rights provides patent trolls with a particularly attractive opportunity to
monopolize the blockchain and hold it hostage until an appropriate ransom is
paid. The economic incentive theory underlying intellectual property suggests
this behavior undermines the constitutional purposes for creating intellectual
property, and results in greater market inefficiency. Despite possible market and
legislative fixes to the blockchain's patent problem, it is the court system that
ultimately is best equipped-and who will inevitably get the opportunity-to
answer uncertainties about the intellectual property rights surrounding the
blockchain.
A broad application of the reasoning announced in Alice, where the Court
held that the computerization of a fundamental economic idea was itself
unpatentable (minus any elements which constitute "significantly more" than the
abstract idea) would push the blockchain back into the public domain (where it
seems its creators intended it to be all along) and allow new adaptors to invest in
the technology without fear of legal repercussion from other competitors or
patent trolls. Considering the subjectivity associated with the phrase
"significantly more," this broad reading would not seem to constitute a broad
deviation from the current status quo.
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